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Human Security: Undermining Human 
Rights?
Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann*
AbSTRAcT
This article warns that the human security discourse and agenda could 
inadvertently undermine the international human rights regime. Insofar as 
human security identifies new threats to well-being, new victims of those 
threats, new duties of states, or new mechanisms for dealing with threats at 
the inter-state level, it adds to the established human rights regime. When 
it simply rephrases human rights principles without identifying new threats, 
victims, duty-bearers, or mechanisms, however, at best it complements 
human rights and at worst it undermines them. A narrow view of human 
security is a valuable addition to the international normative regime requir-
ing state and international action against severe threats to human beings. 
By contrast, an overly broad view of human security ignores the human 
rights regime; by subsuming human rights under human security, it also 
undermines the primacy of civil and political rights as a strategic tool for 
citizens to fight for their rights against their own states. 
I. INTRodUcTIoN
This article warns that the human security discourse and agenda has the 
capacity to inadvertently undermine the international human rights regime. 
* Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann is Canada Research Chair in International Human Rights at 
Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada, where she holds a joint appointment in the Department 
of Global Studies and the Balsillie School of International Affairs. She is also a Fellow of 
the Royal Society of Canada. In 2006 the Human Rights section of the American Political 
Science Association named Dr. Howard-Hassmann its first Distinguished Scholar of Human 
Rights. Among many other published works on human rights, she is co-editor of the 2008 
volume, The Age of Apology, and author of Reparations to Africa (2008) and Can Globaliza-
tion Promote Human Rights? (2010). Her most recent article in the Human Rights Quarterly 
is “Mugabe’s Zimbabwe 2000–2009: Massive Human Rights Violations and the Failure to 
Protect,” (Nov. 2010). 
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It argues that insofar as human security identifies new threats to well-being, 
new victims of those threats, new duties of states, or new mechanisms of 
dealing with threats at the inter-state level, it adds to the established human 
rights regime. Insofar as it simply rephrases human rights principles with-
out identifying new threats, victims, duty-bearers, or mechanisms, at best 
it complements human rights and at worst it could undermine them. The 
narrow view of human security, as defined below, is a valuable addition to 
the international normative regime requiring state and international action 
against severe threats to human beings. By contrast, the broader view of 
human security at best repeats, and possibly undermines, the already extant 
human rights regime, especially by converting state obligations to respect 
individuals’ inalienable human rights into policy decisions regarding which 
aspects of human security to protect under which circumstances. The two 
may be competing discourses, despite arguments by some scholars that 
they are not.1
II. HUMAN SEcURITY: THE coNcEpT
The term “human security” was introduced into international discussion in 
the 1990s as a response to new (or more generalized) “downside risks” that 
could affect everyone. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
defined human security as both “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, 
disease and repression” and “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions 
in the patterns of daily life.”2 Although the actual term “human security” 
was first used by the UNDP in 1994, its origins can be traced to earlier UN 
commissions on the environment, development, and global governance.3 
The Clinton administration used the term in many foreign policy speeches 
in 1993 and 1994.4 Even earlier, the Helsinki Accords of 1975 linked state 
security to individual human rights.5
The 1994 UNDP report focused on the risks of “Unchecked population 
growth, Disparities in economic opportunities, Excessive international mi-
gration, Environmental degradation, Drug production and trafficking, [and] 
International terrorism.”6 Later, other risks such as the spread of disease and 
  1. Shahrbanou TadjbakhSh & anuradha M. Chenoy, huMan SeCuriTy: ConCepTS and iMpliCaTionS 12 
(2007). 
  2. uniTed naTionS developMenT prograMMe [undp], huMan developMenT reporT 1994, at 23 
(1994) [hereinafter huMan developMenT reporT 1994].
  3. See Gerd Oberleitner, Human Security: A Challenge to International Law?, 11 global 
governanCe 185, 185 (2005).
  4. Emma Rothschild, What is Security?, daedaluS, Summer 1995, at 53, 55.
  5. jaCk donnelly, univerSal huMan righTS: in Theory and praCTiCe 249 (2d ed. 2003).
  6. huMan developMenT reporT 1994, supra note 2, at 34.
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instability in financial markets were added.7 The human security agenda 
focuses on “early warning and prevention” of all these downside risks,8 to 
which almost everyone, rich and poor, in the North or South, is vulnerable. 
Thus, the human security agenda identifies “new” threats to human well-
being in the sense that the threats are actually new (climate change), more 
extreme than in previous decades (terrorism), or previously not thought of 
as a threat to human security (excessive migration).
The stress on “human” security was meant to be a counterweight to the 
view that the only form of security that mattered was state security, defined 
quite narrowly as “military defense of state interests and territory.”9 The focus 
of human security is “people,” as opposed to states. Human security’s prin-
cipal goal is to extend the concept of security beyond national security, as 
one way to force states to pay more attention to the needs of their citizens. 
The choice of the term “security” is meant to persuade governments that 
citizens’ security is state security; if citizens are insecure, then states are 
insecure. Furthermore, the term implies that states can be adversely affected 
by the insecurity of citizens outside their own borders: for example, by un-
controllable flows of illegal economic migrants. As a matter of self-interest, 
therefore, governments should participate in the protection of citizens of 
other states against standard threats to their security. Thus, human security 
can identify new victims of threats in the sense that it proposes broadening 
each state’s responsibilities to citizens of other states, not only through the 
mechanisms of international laws or courts to which states may be party, 
but also through other aspects of each state’s foreign and, indeed, domestic 
policies. For example, a state might decide to devote more resources to 
international efforts to ameliorate the threat of climate change or terrorism, 
or to liberalize its immigration laws. 
The other innovation of the human security agenda is its suggestion that 
the international community has obligations to protect “people” by inter-
vening to protect citizens’ security when their own states cannot provide it. 
Human security, in the view of one of its advocates, is a form of “forward 
defense” against common threats to humanity, utilizing new diplomatic and 
other tools.10 It identifies new duty-bearers to protect human security and 
suggests new mechanisms that they can use. Thus, the original 1994 hu-
man security agenda intersects with the later agenda of the Responsibility to 
Protect Doctrine (R2P)11 in an on-going attempt to legitimize and regularize 
  7. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, New Threats to Human Security in the Era of Globalization, 4 j. 
huM. dev. 167, 175–76 (2003).
  8. Id. at 171.
  9. Roland Paris, Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?, inT’l SeCuriTy, Fall 2001, at 
87, 87.
 10. Paul Heinbecker, Human Security: The Hard Edge, Canadian Mil. j., Spring 2000, at 
11,13.
 11. Lloyd Axworthy, Foreword to Trade, aid and SeCuriTy: an agenda for peaCe and developMenT 
xiii (Oli Brown et al. eds., 2007).
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international intervention when states cannot, or will not, protect their own 
citizens. The R2P report, commissioned by the government of Canada as one 
of its human security initiatives, argues that the international community is 
justified in undertaking military intervention when states fail to protect their 
citizens from large scale loss of life that is a product of deliberate state ac-
tion, state neglect, or inability to act; when there is a failed state situation; 
or when there is large-scale ethnic cleansing.12 In 2005 the UN General 
Assembly agreed in principle with these recommendations.13
Despite the fairly compact list of generalized threats in the 1994 UNDP 
Report, there is substantial analytical disagreement about precisely what 
constitutes human insecurity. The narrower view focuses on crisis situations 
that require international remedies.14 In some instances, the human security 
agenda can transcend professional distinctions such as between “humani-
tarian relief, development assistance, human rights advocacy and conflict 
resolution,”15 requiring new, coordinated mechanisms of international coop-
eration or intervention to replace the piecemeal institutional approach that 
characterized international attempts to remedy large-scale crises in the past. 
This narrow approach stems in part from the human security agenda 
proposed and implemented by the then Liberal Foreign Minister of Canada, 
Lloyd Axworthy, in the late 1990s.16 In his view, human security referred to 
such matters as “[p]rotecting civilians, addressing the plight of war-affected 
children and the threat of terrorism and drugs, managing open borders, and 
combating infectious diseases.”17 Human security lost its premier place in 
Canadian foreign policy after Axworthy’s tenure as Foreign Minister ended 
in 2000, even under succeeding Liberal Ministers.18
Other attempts to define human security take a broader approach than 
did Axworthy. Convened in 2001 at the behest of Japan, the Commission on 
Human Security delivered its Report in 2003, arguing inter alia that human 
security included protection against extreme impoverishment, provision of 
basic education, and provision of health care and social protection.19 This 
 12. inTernaTional CoMMiSSion on inTervenTion and STaTe SovereignTy, The reSponSibiliTy To proTeCT 
xi–xii (2001).
 13. gareTh evanS, The reSponSibiliTy To proTeCT: ending MaSS aTroCiTy CriMeS onCe and for all 
3–4 (2008). 
 14. Nicholas Thomas & William T. Tow, The Utility of Human Security: Sovereignty and 
Humanitarian Intervention, 33 SeCuriTy dialogue 177, 178 (2002).
 15. Peter Uvin, A Field of Overlaps and Interactions, 35 SeCuriTy dialogue 352, 352 (2004).
 16. Lloyd Axworthy, Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First, 7 global 
governanCe 19 (2001); Nik Hynek & David Bosold, A History and Genealogy of the 
Freedom-from-Fear Doctrine, 64 INT’L J. 735, 738 (2009).
 17. Axworthy, supra note 16, at 19. 
 18. Hynek & Bosold, supra note 16; Francis J. Furtado, Human Security: Did it Live? Has 
it Died? Does it Matter?, 63 inT’l j. 405, 418 (2008).
 19. CoMMiSSion on huMan SeCuriTy, huMan SeCuriTy now 6–7 (2003). 
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Japanese “security-development nexus”20 was partly a reaction to the im-
poverishment caused by the Asian economic crisis of 1997 to 1999,21 which 
resulted in a heightened sense of vulnerability in the Asian region to world 
economic events.22 Japan set up a UN Trust Fund for Human Security in 
1999, with a budget of $170 million by 2002.23 The Trust’s geographical focus 
was Southeast Asia and Africa, and its substantive focus was development.24 
The “Japanese” approach, ostensibly stressing development or freedom from 
want, is sometimes contrasted with the “Canadian” approach, ostensibly 
stressing freedom from fear.25 However, in 2006 Japan and Mexico estab-
lished a Friends of Human Security network within the United Nations.26 This 
discussion forum for state and UN representatives leaned towards a broad, 
multidimensional view of human security, focusing on both freedom from 
want and freedom from fear.27 
Some scholars advocate an even broader definition of human security 
than freedom from want and fear, referring to almost any aspect of an indi-
vidual’s life that might make her insecure. Gary King and Christopher J.L. 
Murray, for example, redefine human security as “the number of years of 
future life spent outside a state of ‘generalized poverty.’”28 Gunhild Hoo-
gensen and Svein Vigeland Rottem include domestic violence as an indicator 
of human insecurity, while Mary Caprioli applies the language of human 
security to the entire range of women’s rights.29 Even more nebulous is the 
idea of human security as “social, psychological, political, and economic 
factors that promote and protect human well-being through time.”30 Thus, 
 20. David Roberts, Human Security or Human Insecurity? Moving the Debate Forward, 37 
SeCuriTy dialogue 249 (2006).
 21. CoMMiSSion on huMan SeCuriTy, supra note 19, at 8–9.
 22. Amitav Acharya, Human Security: East Versus West, 56 inT’l j. 442, 448 (2001); Paul 
Evans, A Concept Still on the Margins,but Evolving from Its Asian Roots, 35 SeCuriTy 
dialogue 363 (2004).
 23. David Bosold & Sascha Werthes, Human Security in Practice: Canadian and Japanese 
Experiences, 1 inTernaTionale poliTik und geSellSChafT [inT’l poliTiCS and SoC’y] 84, 95 (2005).
 24. Id.
 25. Id. at 94–95.
 26. Gerd Oberleitner, Human Security, in enCyClopedia of huMan righTS 486–87 (David P. 
Forsythe ed., 2009).
 27. Meeting Summary, UN Trust Fund for Human Security, Third Meeting of Friends of Hu-
man Security—New York (2007), available at http://ochaonline.un.org/OutreachandABHS/
Outreach/2007Activities/ThirdmeetingoftheFriendsofHumanSecurity/tabid/2877/language/
en-US/Default.aspx.
 28. Gary King & Christopher J.L. Murray, Rethinking Human Security, 116 pol. SCi. Q. 585, 
585 (2002).
 29. Gunhild Hoogensen & Svein Vigeland Rottem, Gender Identity and the Subject of 
Security, 35 SeCuriTy dialogue 155, 167 (2004); Mary Caprioli, Democracy and Human 
Rights Versus Women’s Security: A Contradiction?, 35 SeCuriTy dialogue 411 (2004).
 30. Jennifer Leaning, Psychological Well-Being over Time, 35 SeCuriTy dialogue 354, 354 
(2004).
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in the broader interpretations proposed by some scholars, human security 
now seems to refer to any possible need that any individual might have, 
including needs, such as provision of psychological security, never before 
defined as an obligation of either states or the international system. 
This broad view of human insecurity sometimes identifies new threats to 
individuals’ well-being and perhaps new victims of such threats, depending 
on each researcher’s view of what human security should comprise. Moreover, 
it implicitly proposes new duties on states to protect the victims of violations 
of well-being, both internally and within other states, and implicitly suggests 
that new mechanisms for protection are needed. However, it is not clear 
what these new duties are or what new mechanisms might be used to realize 
them. If the duty-bearer for human security is the international community, 
or some subset of it, then the new mechanisms the community could use 
to combat generalized poverty, domestic violence, or psychological factors 
that undermine human well-being are far from clearly explained.
III. INTERNATIoNAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw coMpAREd wITH 
HUMAN SEcURITY
Human rights are rights that, in principle, all human beings are entitled to, 
merely by virtue of being biologically human. They are individual rights, not 
tied to any particular social status or to group, communal, national, or any 
other membership. Human rights do not have to be earned, nor can they be 
limited except by conformity to the rule of law, for example when convicted 
criminals are deprived of freedom of movement. Individual human beings 
can assert their human rights, while states and other entities are obliged 
to respect, protect, and fulfill them. To respect human rights means not to 
violate them; to protect them means to ensure that they are not violated by 
others; and to fulfill them means to implement positive measures to ensure 
that individuals enjoy their rights. Human rights are also inalienable, mean-
ing that the state may not withdraw any individual’s human rights except 
under conditions prescribed by the rule of law or (for some rights only) in 
situations of national emergency. 
The international human rights legal regime precedes the discourse on 
human security by over forty years. Human rights were originally enshrined 
in the UN International Bill of Rights, which consists of the1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1966 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 1966 International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).31 Civil and political rights 
 31. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III), 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217A (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; International 
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include, for example, protection against torture, the right to a fair trial, and 
the right to vote.32 Economic, social, and cultural rights include, for example, 
the right to work, the right to form trade unions, and the rights to education, 
social security, an adequate standard of living, and the highest attainable 
standard of health.33 There are also so-called collective rights, such as the 
right to development.34 Many other more specific human rights treaties, some 
of which are mentioned below, have been agreed to since 1966. 
Since the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights was held 
in Vienna in 1993, international law has recognized that all human rights 
are universal, indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated: it is impossible to 
enjoy one set of rights without enjoying the other sets. 35 This principle thus 
predates assumptions of inter-connectedness among solutions to problems 
of human insecurity. 
Human rights were originally designed to protect the individual against 
the state.36 Gross human rights violations such as extra-judicial execution, 
arbitrary arrest, and torture are usually committed by the state, although they 
can also be committed by non-state entities such as armed rebel militias. 
Civil rights such as due process, a fair trial, and habeas corpus are neces-
sary to protect citizens against these abuses, as are political rights such as 
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the right to vote. The ubiquity 
of the state makes a universal human rights standard necessary, regardless 
of the type of political regime. 
Since the inception of the UDHR, however, human rights have gradually 
evolved to also protect individuals against non-state actors;37 all organs of 
society are expected to protect human rights. An emerging normative regime 
obliges transnational corporations and international organizations such as in-
ternational financial institutions (IFIs) to also respect human rights.38 Moreover, 
   Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) 
[hereinafter ICCPR], 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976); International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 
2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. 
A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICESCR], 993 U.N.T.S 3 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976).
 32. ICCPR, supra note 31, arts. 7, 14, 25.
 33. ICESCR, supra note 31, arts. 6, 8, 10–12.
 34. Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted 4 Dec. 1986, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. 
GAOR, 41st Sess., 97th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986). 
 35. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted 25 June 1993, U.N. GAOR, 
World Conf. on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993); daniel j. whelan, indiviSible 
huMan righTS: a hiSTory 1 (2010).
 36. See MiCheline r. iShay, The hiSTory of huMan righTS froM anCienT TiMeS To The globalizaTion 
era 63–116 (2004); lynn hunT, invenTing huMan righTS (2007).
 37. non-STaTe aCTorS in The huMan righTS univerSe (George Andreopoulos, Zehra F. Kabasakal 
Arat & Peter Juviler eds., 2006). 
 38. Ralph G. Steinhardt, Corporate Responsibility and the International Law of Human Rights: 
The New Lex Mercatoria, in non-STaTe aCTorS and huMan righTS 177 (Philip Alston 
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human rights obligations now extend to what was earlier considered to be 
the “private” societal and familial level. Society, the family, and individuals 
bear human rights obligations to the disabled, the aged, women, children, 
and increasingly to sexual minorities. Treaties such as the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) protect women and 
children against social actors and against abuse by family members, as well 
as against abuse by the state.39 
Regarding the interplay between the international human rights legal 
regime and the discourse of human security, it is of utmost importance to 
recognize that respect for, protection of, and fulfillment of human rights are 
not policy choices. States may not pick and choose which rights to protect, 
whose rights to protect, or when to protect them. States that have signed and 
ratified the relevant human rights treaties are not permitted to prioritize one 
right, or set of rights, over another in the fulfillment of policy objectives.40 
Nor may states use real or perceived security threats as excuses to pick 
and choose which rights to respect, whether the threats are traditional state 
security threats such as military attack or new human security threats such 
as climate change. Although some human rights may be suspended during 
states of emergency, others—such as the protection against torture41—may 
not be derogated from regardless of the situation. 
Furthermore, states must protect the rights of their individual citizens. 
They may not derogate from the rights of some individuals in the name of 
protection of the national people, or any subset thereof. Individual citizens 
possess the legal right to demand that their human rights be enforced, whereas 
   ed., 2005); Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue 
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John 
Ruggie. Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility 
and Accountability for Corporate Acts, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Council, 4th Sess., Prov. 
Agenda Item 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35 (2007); Mark Gibney, Katarina Tomaseˇvski, & 
Jens Vedsted-Hansen, Transnational State Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, 
12 harv. huM. rTS. j. 267 (1999); Mark gibney, inTernaTional huMan righTS law: reTurning 
To univerSal prinCipleS (2008); david kinley, CiviliSing globaliSaTion: huMan righTS and The 
global eConoMy (2009); andrew ClaphaM, huMan righTS obligaTionS of non-STaTe aCTorS 
(2006). 
 39. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted 
18 Dec. 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., 107th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 
46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980) [hereinafter CEDAW], 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered 
into force 3 Sept. 1981); Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted 20 Nov. 1989, 
G.A. Res 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 61st plen. mtg., Agenda Item 108, Supp. No.49, 
at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 2 Sept. 1990).
 40. Gerd Oberleitner, Porcupines in Love: The Intricate Convergence of Human Rights and 
Human Security, 6 eur. huM. rTS. l. rev. 588, 596 (2005).
 41. ICCPR, supra note 31, arts. 4, 7. 
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the individual has no standing in the human security discussion.42 National 
laws; regional treaties such as the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the American Convention on 
Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights;43 and 
international bodies such as the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
are all entities to which individuals can appeal violations of their rights, 
although their enforcement powers differ. 
On the other hand, rarely can an individual appeal to a state to protect 
his human rights if he is not a citizen of that state. This leaves stateless in-
dividuals unprotected, while migrants, whether legal or illegal, frequently 
have no recourse against violation of their human rights even if they remain 
citizens of a state where they no longer reside. Human security’s broadening 
of states’ responsibilities to include non-citizens, even if only in principle 
rather than practice, is thus a significant change from the international hu-
man rights regime, with its insistence primarily on states’ responsibilities to 
their own citizens.44
Defenders of the human security approach might argue that although 
the human rights legal regime is extensive, it has not had much, if any, real 
positive effect since 1945. Some scholars argue that there is no evidence that 
when a state signs a human rights treaty, its actual human rights performance 
improves.45 It seems that states sign treaties and take part in the ritual of 
UN human rights monitoring to gain international and internal legitimacy, 
rather than to improve their domestic human rights performance. On the 
other hand, some states are acculturated by international norms to improve 
their own human rights performance,46 and states that UN monitoring bodies 
criticize for poor protection of human rights after signing the ICCPR and the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment (CAT)47 improve their performance.48 Recent statistical 
 42. Rothschild, supra note 4, at 70–71.
 43. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
opened for signature 4 Nov. 1950, art. 34, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Eur. T.S. No. 5 (entered 
into force 3 Sept. 1953); American Convention on Human Rights, signed 22 Nov. 1969, 
art. 44, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1979), O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 143 (entered into force 18 July 1978); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, art. 55, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/ Rev. 5, 1520 U.N.T.S. 
217 (entered into force 21 Oct. 1986).
 44. Rothschild, supra note 4, at 83.
 45. Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 j. peaCe reS. 95 (1999).
 46. helen M. STaCy, huMan righTS for The 21ST CenTury: SovereignTy, Civil SoCieTy, CulTure 124 
(2009).
 47. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, adopted 10 Dec. 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 93d plen. 
mtg., Agenda Item 99, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985) [hereinafter 
CAT], 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987).
 48. STaCy, supra note 46, at 130. ann Marie Clark, inTernaTional SourCeS of huMan righTS Change 
(2009). 
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work shows that on average, state ratification of human rights treaties does 
improve internal human rights performance.49
The human rights legal regime is also the underpinning for a strong, in-
ternational civil society movement that has penetrated all areas of the world 
during the last three decades. The regime is a standard of achievement upon 
which citizens can rely in criticizing not only their own governments, but 
also non-state entities such as private corporations, and supra-state interna-
tional organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. Even when the human rights obligations of non-state and supra-state 
entities are not yet strongly enshrined in law, the normative power of human 
rights is compelling.50
On the other hand, the human rights regime does not make strong de-
mands on the international system. Few international mechanisms exist that 
can actually check human rights abuses. The UN Security Council (UNSC) 
can pass resolutions regarding human rights abuses it deems to adversely 
affect international peace and security. The International Criminal Court 
(ICC) can convict individuals of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or 
genocide, but only after they have already severely abused human rights. 
Various UN human rights committees dealing with civil and political rights; 
economic, social, and cultural rights; racial discrimination; discrimination 
against women; protection against torture; children’s rights; and rights of 
migrant workers can assess and comment on state reports of compliance with 
human rights treaty obligations.51 In some circumstances, these committees 
can also hear individual complaints against states. None of these commit-
tees, however, have enforcement powers; they can only monitor states that 
violate human rights, shame the violators, and persuade them to change their 
practices. Thus, although individual states bear the responsibility to protect 
their citizens’ human rights (and in some cases, the rights of non-citizens), 
the international system as a whole does not bear similar responsibilities. 
IV. IMpRoVING oN THE INTERNATIoNAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME
The narrower view of human security, as originally proposed in the 1994 
UNDP Report, identifies some new, and universal, threats to human well-
being. It identifies collective, existential threats that are not direct human 
rights violations, such as climate change.52 It also identifies threats to people 
 49. beTh a. SiMMonS, Mobilizing for huMan righTS: inTernaTional law in doMeSTiC poliTiCS (2009); 
Todd landMan, proTeCTing huMan righTS: a CoMparaTive STudy (2005).
 50. rhoda e. howard-haSSMann, Can globalizaTion proMoTe huMan righTS? 99–114 (2010).
 51. julie a. MerTuS, The uniTed naTionS and huMan righTS: a guide for a new era 80 (2005).
 52. huMan developMenT reporT 1994, supra note 2, at 36. 
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who otherwise enjoy all their human rights, like the financial crises of 2008 
and 2011, which seemed to indicate for many middle-class North Americans 
the end of the financial security they were used to and that permitted them 
to enjoy their economic human rights. The narrow human security agenda 
also focuses attention on people who are not under the legal or effective 
protection of any state, such as stateless individuals, non-status refugees, and 
illegal economic migrants. However, there is some disagreement regarding 
who exactly is the object of human security protection. Astri Sukhre suggests 
that “the core of human insecurity can be seen as extreme vulnerability,” 
so that the responsibility is to protect the most vulnerable.53 This appears 
to contradict the original contribution of the 1994 Human Development 
Report, which identified existential threats that pertained to everyone, even 
those not normally thought to be vulnerable at all.54 
The narrower human security agenda also permits a new approach to 
international relations. It is a political, mobilizing slogan to undermine exclu-
sive state sovereignty over the security of people, or citizens.55 It represents 
a new vehicle for the creation of norms that can reinforce R2P principles, 
cascade into the wider foreign policy community, and perhaps eventually 
influence new norms guiding the decisions of the UNSC, such as the 2006 
UNSC Resolution 1674 on the Responsibility to Protect.56 This Resolution’s 
primary purpose is to advise states that they bear the responsibility to protect 
their own citizens; that is, they no longer possess the sovereign right to treat 
their citizens as they see fit, especially if this means violating their human 
rights. Clause 26 of the Resolution also notes that “the deliberate targeting 
of civilians and other protected persons, and the commission of systematic, 
flagrant and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human 
rights law in situations of armed conflict, may constitute a threat to inter-
national peace and security,” and reaffirms the readiness of the UNSC “to 
consider such situations and, where necessary, to adopt appropriate steps” 
to ameliorate these violations.57
Thus, the narrow view of human security proposes stronger enforcement 
mechanisms for the international community to remedy extreme human rights 
violations, whether interstate or intrastate.58 This is an important innovation, 
even in light of the widening of human rights obligations discussed above: 
 53. Astri Suhrke, Human Security and the Interests of States, 30 SeCuriTy dialogue 265, 272 
(1999).
 54. huMan developMenT reporT 1994, supra note 2, at 22.
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individuals and groups still do not have any right to call on the international 
community to protect them in times of severe human rights abuse such 
as genocide or ethnic cleansing. For all such protections, they depend on 
states’ votes in the UNSC.
The narrower human security agenda also provides clearer foreign policy 
focus and guidance for those states that seriously adopt it, as Canada did 
when Axworthy was Foreign Minister.59 Promotion of a ban on land mines, 
concern for child soldiers, promotion of the ICC, and commissioning the 
R2P Report gave Canada a niche in international diplomacy and a way to 
exercise “soft” or persuasive power without resorting to force.60 It provided 
an independent role in the formation of international policy for some like-
minded middle powers and less-developed states.61
The Canadian, Norwegian, and Swiss governments established a Human 
Security Network in 1998,62 which other countries including Chile, Jordan, 
Austria, Ireland, Mali, Greece, Slovakia, Thailand, the Netherlands, and South 
Africa (with observer status only) joined.63 The Network’s main activity is 
the annual meeting of member states’ foreign ministers, who also consult 
on human security with non-governmental organizations.64 This coalition, 
however, lacks focus. It has adopted the broader human security approach, 
concerning itself not only with the concise foreign policy matters that were 
originally Canada’s concerns, but also with “people-centered development,” 
including alleviation of poverty and provision of social services.65 Moreover, 
most, if not all, members of the Network are “relatively minor players” 
in international affairs.66 Thus, the Network does not appear to have had 
any significant impact on how the international community addresses the 
responsibility to protect people, either from gross human rights violations 
such as genocide or from day-to-day intrastate violations of human rights. 
V. SUboRdINATING HUMAN RIGHTS To HUMAN SEcURITY
The 1994 UNDP Report refers to human rights in its section on political 
security, stating: “One of the most important aspects of human security is 
 59. Axworthy, supra note 16.
 60. Jutta Brunnée & Stephen Toope, Canada and the Use of Force: Reclaiming Human 
Security, 59 inT’l j. 247, 249 (2004).
 61. Laurent Goetschel, The Need for a Contextualized and Trans-Disciplinary Approach to 
Human Security, 23 SiCherheiT und frieden [SeCuriTy & peaCe] 26, 29 (2005).
 62. Can. CTr. for foreign poliCy dev., roundTable on Canada-norway relaTionS: The lySøen 
deClaraTion (1998).
 63. Krause, supra note 55, at 3.
 64. aliSon brySk, global good SaMariTanS: huMan righTS aS foreign poliCy 206–08 (2009).
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that people should be able to live in a society that honours their basic hu-
man rights.”67 It argues:
For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life 
than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Will they and their families 
have enough to eat? Will they lose their jobs? Will their streets and neighbour-
hoods be safe from crime? Will they be tortured by a repressive state? Will 
they become a victim of violence because of their gender? Will their religion 
or ethnic origin target them for persecution?68
This list of threats to individual human rights does not identify new threats, 
new victims, new duties, or new mechanisms to remedy human rights vio-
lations. Thus, it does not show how using the language of human security 
instead of referring to national law or the international human rights legal 
regime might improve the situation of victims of human rights abuses. It is 
already the duty of states to remedy these worries about daily life. National 
welfare policies exist (in some states) to ensure that everyone has enough 
to eat and to provide some income for people who lose their jobs; these 
policies fulfill the obligations of states that are party to the ICESCR. Although 
individuals’ personal physical security is indeed threatened by crime, states 
bear the primary responsibility through their police forces to protect in-
dividuals against criminals. International human rights laws and treaties, 
including the CAT and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD), already impose obligations on states to protect 
individuals against torture and against religious and ethnic discrimination.69 
Finally, national criminal laws already exist to combat violence against 
women, which are reinforced in principle by the UN Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women.70 States that do not protect their 
citizens from want, crime, torture, discrimination, or gender-based violence 
when these abuses are considered human rights violations are no more likely 
to protect their citizens when those same abuses are considered violations 
of their citizens’ security. 
Moreover, to re-label these common threats to human well-being as hu-
man insecurity rather than human rights violations does not shift responsibility 
for their amelioration from states to the international arena. For example, 
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only in the last instance, through refugee law, is there an obligation on other 
states to protect individuals against domestic violence or torture in their 
home state.71 States are not obliged to protect citizens of other states from 
poverty; economic refugees are not a legally-recognized category. Some legal 
scholars do argue for expansion of state responsibilities to citizens of other 
states; for example, jurisprudence emerging from the UN Declaration on 
the Right to Development maintains that richer states are obliged to assist 
poorer states to develop.72 These proposed changes, however, emerge from 
reinterpretations and extensions of existing human rights law, not from the 
discourse of human security. 
Except insofar as it encompasses within its purview the narrower ap-
proach, the broader vocabulary of human security does not improve on 
the national laws, principles, and policies meant to protect, promote, and 
fulfill human rights, nor does it improve on the international human rights 
legal regime. The international community is unlikely to adopt the duty to 
remedy human rights abuses clearly in individual states’ domains of domes-
tic responsibility unless they reach the threshold, not only of exceptionally 
violent and widespread abuse, but also of threats to other countries, such 
as increased risks of terrorism, or threats to traditional international peace 
and security. Nor is the international community likely to adopt new hu-
manitarian mechanisms to protect individuals against the entire range of 
insecurities to which they are subject, by and within their own states. For 
most human rights abuses or insecurities, the international community will 
continue to rely on persuasion, shaming, and monitoring by the various UN 
human rights treaty bodies, occasionally and inconsistently using stronger 
measures such as sanctions and military intervention to combat genocide 
or ethnic cleansing. 
Just as the 1994 UNDP Report neglects the preexisting human rights 
regime, there is also remarkably little reference to the human rights regime 
in the scholarly debate on human security. Indeed, some scholars of human 
security ignore the human rights regime.73 They do not acknowledge that 
international human rights law already addresses many of the problems they 
identify, such as underdevelopment and the failure to fulfill individuals’ basic 
needs of food, shelter, health care, and education. 
Sadako Ogata and Johan Cels, for example, list ten key human security 
concerns.74 Four concerns fit the narrower human security agenda and are 
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not adequately addressed, if at all, by existing human rights law: protection of 
people in violent conflicts, protection from weapons proliferation, protection 
of “people on the move” (other than migrant workers and their families),75 
and the responsibility to rebuild in conflict situations. Four other concerns are 
already extensively covered by human rights documents: ensuring livelihoods 
and work-based security, such as women’s rights to access credit covered in 
Article 14(1)(g) of CEDAW;76 poverty-related health threats, covered in the 
ICESCR and subsequent documents;77 the right of the poor to benefit from 
technological and knowledge-based advances, already noted as a universal 
right in Article 27(1) of the UDHR;78 and the right to basic education, noted 
in Article 26 of the UDHR and in many subsequent documents.79 
Ogata and Cels’ ninth suggestion, that markets be reformed to bal-
ance growth and investment with social services and human development, 
is prefigured in the extensive discussion in the human rights literature of 
the responsibilities of multinational corporations and IFIs.80 Even Ogata 
and Cels’ tenth, most nebulous, and most difficult goal—to form “com-
passionate attitudes and ethical outlooks from a global perspective”81—is 
presaged in the UDHR’s statement that “education shall be directed . . . to 
the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It 
shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, 
racial or religious groups.”82
Gerd Oberleitner states, “Human security is a concept based on com-
mon values rather than national interest,” yet there is already an enormous 
body of human rights law based on common values rather than national 
interest.83 As of October 2011, 167 states were party to the ICCPR, 160 to 
the ICESCR, 175 to CERD, 149 to CAT, and 187 to CEDAW, all key treaties 
dealing with—and predating—many of the preoccupations of the broader 
view of human security.84 It is unlikely that states that are already party to 
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human rights treaties, yet ignore their obligations, will honor them if they are 
articulated in the guise of human security rather than human rights. Rather, 
attention to human security as the reigning discourse of international justice 
might help delinquent states deflect attention from their violations of human 
rights. The discourse of human security is not one of state obligations and 
individual entitlements: it is a discourse that permits states to make choices 
as to what aspects of human dignity they wish to protect. 
In the human security discourse, moreover, human rights appear to be 
merely a subset of human security concerns, and as such less worthy of at-
tention than they have heretofore been. Fen Osler Hampson, for instance, 
presents an idiosyncratic definition of human rights, derived from American 
constitutional principles.85 He claims that the “‘natural rights/rule of law’ 
conception of human security . . . is anchored in the fundamental liberal 
assumption that individuals have a basic right to ‘life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness.’”86 In fact, human rights are far more firmly articulated in 
international law than Hampson suggests and they address a much wider 
range of problems than he identifies. Hampson’s definition of human rights 
trivializes them by not referring to the body of international law built up 
since the 1948 UDHR and by not identifying what rights already overlap 
with, and indeed precede, the human security agenda. 
A key aspect of the human security rhetoric is its focus on freedom 
from fear and freedom from want,87 referring back to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
famous speech on the Four Freedoms in 1941.88 Freedom from fear of extra-
judicial killings, torture, imprisonment, and other such abuses is central to 
the earliest conceptions of human rights, as reflected in the UDHR and the 
ICCPR. Freedom from want is also a central part of the human rights agenda, 
embedded in both the UDHR and the ICESCR. The stress on freedom from 
want and freedom from fear in the human security discourse runs the risk of 
separating the two, the “Axworthy school” emphasizing freedom from fear 
while the “Japanese school” emphasizes freedom from want. This division 
is facile, as those who want also often fear, and those who fear also often 
want, as the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights affirmed by declaring 
the indivisibility of human rights.89 Freedom from want—stressed by the 
development-oriented Japanese school—requires freedom from fear (of 
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torture, imprisonment, execution); citizens require protection of their civil 
and political rights in order to achieve their economic human rights. China, 
for example, has experienced rapid economic growth since 1978 without 
instituting civil and political rights; without these rights, citizens are unable 
to protest China’s growing inequality, official corruption, and irrelevant or 
utterly rights-abusive “development” projects.
To de-politicize freedom from want by suggesting that it is merely a 
consequence of insufficient development implies that state agents are less 
responsible than impersonal market forces for human insecurity. This rhetoric 
allows states to endorse a cosmetic agenda of concern for their citizens’ 
material needs while ignoring their own complicity in creating want. Under-
development is often exacerbated by state policies such as underpayment 
for peasants’ crops by state marketing boards, as in Uzbekistan;90 forcible 
expropriations of citizens’ land or urban property, as in Zimbabwe;91 or 
unreasonable controls on urban markets, as in Venezuela.92 It is also exac-
erbated—if not indeed caused—by the massive corruption of state elites. 
One should, therefore, be wary of states that encourage the broader 
human security approach as an alternative to better protection of human 
rights within their own societies. If the broader concept of human security 
is attractive to Asian states, that may be not only because it focuses on sup-
posedly apolitical problems of development, but also because it deflects 
attention away from internal and avoidable violations of human rights. The 
concept of human security might nicely replace the discredited claims of 
earlier decades to collective, communitarian Asian93 and African concepts of 
“human rights” that deliberately undermined their individual and inalienable 
characteristics, and ignored the necessity for a rule of law that permitted 
individuals to make claims against the state. 
Oberleitner suggests that human security can show “that human rights 
and the security of nation states . . . are not opposing aims but in fact con-
verge.”94 Long-term analysis of such states as the United States, China, or 
Israel might indeed support such a point of view, but in the shorter term, 
states—or the elites that control them, even in democracies—might well 
believe that suppression of their citizens’ human rights is in their interest. 
While one might wish to believe that both human rights and human security 
demonstrate that “common values are stronger than particular interests,”95 in 
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reality the particular needs—or desires—of those who control states usually 
trump common values. The advantage of the concept of human rights over 
human security is that it recognizes that the interests of individuals and states 
do not converge; that, despite all the inter-state talk and treaties meant to 
protect individuals, their governments continue to abuse them. 
 Keith Krause states that “use of the concept of human security by states 
and decision-makers is not merely a trivial matter of labeling. Rather, it leads 
states and policy-makers to focus on different issues, to ask different ques-
tions, and even to promote different policies.”96 Similarly, Yuen Foong Khong 
notes: “Once an issue . . . is securitized, its status in the policy hierarchy 
changes.”97 The narrower human security discourse focuses particularly on 
threats emerging from failed or collapsed states98 and conflict situations. 
Yet human rights violations can occur just as often in strong states, such 
as China, as in failing states. Similarly, human rights can be violated, and 
often are, in non-conflict situations where there is no evident state failure, 
as in North Korea.99 Human rights problems in strong states that can prevent 
their citizens from fleeing or turning to terrorism do not affect the security of 
other states the way that human rights violations in failing states do. There 
is a danger in focusing only on security issues abroad that might adversely 
affect “‘our’ physical protection,” so that, for example, the Western world 
would focus on poverty in areas that breed terrorism but not on poverty 
elsewhere.100 The securitization of some types of human rights violations 
over others may mean that some violations of human rights will disappear 
from public concern.
The human security discourse, both narrow and broad, may also unin-
tentionally privilege threats to collectivities over threats to individuals. The 
nebulous term, “people,” used in some of the human security discourse, 
contributes to such privileging. “People” can mean a group or collection 
of individuals, or it can mean “a people,” suggesting a particular national 
or minority group. The term “individual” is clearer: any one individual or 
any number of individuals can be victims of human rights violations, even 
if they do not constitute an ethnic or national people or any other kind of 
collectivity. Using the term people does not clarify that individuals take 
priority over collectivities, nor does it clarify that a people does not mean 
a state. By its focus on threats to collectivities rather than individuals, the 
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human security approach could unintentionally undermine human rights 
claim within states by individuals.
VI. UNdERMINING THE INTERNATIoNAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME 
The Commission on Human Security claims that the human rights perspec-
tive “leaves open the question of which particular freedoms are crucial 
enough to count as human rights that society should acknowledge, safeguard 
and promote,” arguing further that “human security can make a significant 
contribution [to defining which human rights are crucial] by identifying the 
importance of freedom from basic insecurities.”101 Further, the Commission 
claims that by using the concept of human security, it can provide “reasoned 
substantiation” for some human rights.102 Yet myriad ethical and empirical 
arguments made over many centuries already provide such reasoned sub-
stantiation, showing that individuals are more secure when not tortured than 
when tortured, when not starving than when starving, when not subjected 
to discrimination than when subjected to it, and so forth. 
Moreover, the Commission’s suggestion that some freedoms are crucial, 
while others are not, implies that that there are some human rights that 
society need not acknowledge, safeguard and promote because they do 
not address basic insecurities. This undermines the wide and substantive 
body of international human rights law that has evolved since 1948.103 In 
the human security discourse, human rights are only one of several “securi-
ties” individuals should enjoy; yet individuals still live primarily under the 
protection of—or threat from—their own states. Many governments violate 
individuals’ human rights and prevent them from publicizing or protesting 
those violations. The human security discourse’s marginalization of individual 
human rights bolsters those governments and makes it easier for them to 
violate human rights in the name of human security.
The human security perspective might be seen as a quasi-realist substitute 
for the liberal internationalist perspective on human rights embodied in the 
international human rights regime. Especially in its narrower incarnation, 
the human security perspective accepts that states exist and that they act 
primarily in their own interests in a world of competing states. Neverthe-
less, in its narrow interpretation, the human security discourse provides a 
shortlist of severe threats to all humanity which, it is thought, almost all 
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states can agree to remedy without undermining the power of incumbent 
political elites. States, however, are not neutral bodies: they are controlled 
or heavily influenced by individuals, elites, private corporations, or particular 
ethnic or other groups. These entities frequently benefit from precisely the 
human insecurity they claim they want to ameliorate; indeed, they may have 
caused the problem in order to benefit from it. Political elites may well profit 
from major threats to human well-being such as drug trafficking, terrorism, 
climate change, or financial crisis. Human rights, by contrast, are designed 
to protect individuals from state elites that deliberately undermine citizens’ 
interests in order to benefit themselves. 
While the narrow view of human security suggests excluding some hu-
man rights from its protection, the broader view is so diffuse as to permit 
states to claim they are protecting human security even as they continue to 
oppress their own citizens. This is especially so regarding the human secu-
rity stress on development. The individual rights to adequate food, shelter, 
health care, and education enumerated in the ICESCR are a concrete guide 
to the entitlements of each individual that must be protected even as states 
implement development programs. These individual rights protect citizens 
against states that violate economic human rights in the name of collective 
or people’s development, for example, by displacing millions of individuals 
when building dams.104
The human rights agenda is wider and more protective than the freedom 
from want and fear stressed in the human security agenda. Hundreds of 
millions of people live without want, in the sense that their basic material 
needs are fulfilled, and without fear, in the sense that they do not fear the 
actions of the state or paramilitary groups. While the world would certainly 
be a far better place if everyone enjoyed freedom from want and fear, how-
ever, this is still a minimalist view of human rights. Upper and middle-class 
women in the Western world, for example, lived without want or fear (at 
least of the state, although not of their husbands or other male “guardians”) 
for decades before they actually realized significant portions of their human 
rights. Human rights are premised on the notion of human dignity; human 
dignity requires that individuals be treated as autonomous beings, living in 
societies where they are recognized as persons of value, where they do not 
suffer from discriminatory legislation, where they are able to participate in 
collective decision-making, and where they can freely pursue their interests. 
Human dignity requires far more than freedom from want and fear, but there 
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is no need to reconfigure human rights as human security to protect human 
dignity; in fact, to do so poses major threats to human dignity protection. 
Moreover, the international human rights legal regime insists on the 
inviolability of civil and political rights. These rights are of paramount im-
portance not only for their intrinsic value—individuals prefer bodily integrity 
over torture, freedom of speech over censorship, freedom of movement over 
confinement—but also for their strategic value, as a means of acquiring and 
protecting other rights, such as to basic education and health care. In the 
past, some commentators objected to a perceived paramountcy of civil and 
political rights over economic, social, and cultural rights, claiming that this 
was a Western bias.105 This objection demonstrates a misunderstanding of 
Western, and world, history: enjoyment of civil and political rights helps 
citizens to act in their own interests, to force states to ensure the personal, 
physical, and material security they need. This was and is the case in the 
West, and is the case in non-Western states now. 
The strategic value of civil and political rights is one reason why both 
the human security and the human rights discourses pay so much attention 
to civil society. Civil and political rights are strategic tools that civil society 
organizations use to obtain economic, social, and cultural rights, and to press 
for development processes that focus on individuals, not on states or favored 
sub-state groups. The human security agenda underplays the importance of 
civil and political rights, weaving them into a “holistic” description of human 
needs106 that ignores how rights are realized and employed in practice. The 
assertion that human security is a useful “policy tool” that can circumvent 
political disputes about human rights risks legitimizing avoidance of human 
rights obligations by rights-abusive states.107
To avoid abuse, human security should focus on the vital core of pro-
tecting “‘all human lives from critical and pervasive threats’”108 that are 
not already protected by, or are inadequately protected by, the existing hu-
man rights regime. In the narrow interpretation, human security constitutes 
“rights-cum-obligations,”109 requiring new, international duty-bearers to find 
new mechanisms to protect rights-holders—that is, individuals—from rights-
abusers, whether the latter are states, international organizations, private 
organizations, or natural events. Yet, in the broader view, “so many different 
issues and themes nestle comfortably under [human security’s] wings that it 
105. R. Panikkar, Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?, inTerCulTure, Jan.–June 
1984, at 28; Olusola Ojo, Understanding Human Rights in Africa, in huMan righTS in a 
pluraliST world: individualS and ColleCTiviTieS 115 (Jan Berting et.al. eds., 1990).
106. Petrasek, supra note 103, at 60.
107. Oberleitner, Porcupines in Love, supra note 40, at 596.
108. See Owen, supra note 100, at 382.
109. TadjbakhSh & Chenoy, supra note 1, at 123.
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is difficult to extract any prescriptions about how to deal with any of them 
other than to look at problems in a ‘people first’ kind of way.”110 As Paul 
Heinbecker puts it, “the more encompassing economic and social definitions 
[of human security], . . . while entirely laudable in their objectives, would 
risk meaning all things to all people and end up meaning nothing to anyone, 
at least nothing new and ‘actionable’ by governments.”111 
Moreover, if the “four essential characteristics” of human security are that 
“it is universal, its components are interdependent, it is best ensured through 
prevention, and it is people-centered,”112 then it must be acknowledged that 
these have long been aspects of human rights. Universality has been the most 
fundamental aspect of human rights since the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948.113 The 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights enshrined 
in law the principle that human rights are interdependent.114 Human rights 
scholars and practitioners have long advocated prevention of human rights 
violations and have focused on individuals (“people”) as opposed to states. 
The narrower discourse of human security does, however, advocate 
new duties and international mechanisms to ameliorate some situations that 
result in massive violations of human rights. Nevertheless, there are already 
many inter-state treaties that require international cooperation in the areas 
that the human security agenda identifies; for example, in protecting the 
rights of migrant workers and their families (although not the rights of other 
migrants), or fighting drug trafficking or human trafficking.115 For the narrow 
human security agenda to improve on the international human rights regime, 
110. evanS, supra note 13, at 35.
111. Paul Heinbecker, Dir. of the Ctr. for Global Relations, Governance and Policy at Wilifrid 
Laurier Univ., Notes from a Keynote Address to the Annual Meeting of the Academic 
Council on the UN System: The US, the UN and Human Security: Protecting People in 
a Unipolar World (1 July 2004), available at http://www.peacedividendtrust.org/EIPdata/
Library/Human%20Security/US_UN_HumanSecurity.pdf.
112. King & Murray, supra note 28, at 589.
113. UDHR, supra, note 31. 
114. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 35.
115. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, adopted 30 Mar. 1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 151 (entered 
into force 13 Dec. 1964); Convention on Psychotropic Substances, adopted 21 Feb. 
1971, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force 16 Aug. 1976); U.N. Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, adopted 20 Dec. 1988, 
1582 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force 11 Nov. 1990); International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, supra 
note 75; U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted 15 Nov. 
2000, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 62d plen. mtg., Agenda Item 105, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/55/25 (2001), 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 (entered into force 29 Sept. 2003) By the 
same resolution the General Assembly also adopted two protocols to the Convention: 
the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children; and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. 
Id.
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the new duties of states and international mechanisms for remedying abuses 
of human security must be clearly defined and backed by law, treaties, 
and material resources. The International Criminal Court, the Landmines 
Treaty, and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict are some examples 
of serious concern with human security that were not addressed through 
preexisting human rights laws.116 The landmines treaty did, however, build 
on preexisting international humanitarian law outlawing particularly cruel 
types of weapons.117 
Despite these genuine contributions of the narrower human security 
agenda to the protection of people, at the moment it appears that anyone 
can jump on the human security bandwagon, advancing her own preoc-
cupations as causes of human insecurity. For the concept to be useful, 
however, it must add some value to human rights protection. As noted 
earlier, the narrow human security focus adds value insofar as it identifies 
new threats to people, such as climate change or sudden financial down-
swings. It also identifies new objects of such threats, pointing out that they 
can affect everyone in the world, rich or poor, regardless of whether some 
already enjoy all their human rights. It suggests new duties requiring states 
and international organizations to ameliorate problems previously unknown 
or previously considered the responsibility of individual states in isolation 
from other states. Finally, the narrower human security agenda suggests new 
international mechanisms for dealing with these threats, contributing to the 
normative push for international responsibility to ameliorate a wider set of 
threats against humanity than merely the threat to international peace and 
security enshrined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.118
By identifying new threats, new objects of threats, new duties of state and 
international organizations, and new mechanisms to ameliorate the threats, 
the narrower view of human security supplements the normative framework 
of human rights. By contrast, the broader human security discourse merely 
extends what is useful in the narrower view to a new rhetoric for identifi-
116. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/9 (1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002); Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on Their Destruction, adopted 9 Dec. 1997, G.A. Res. 52/38(A), 52d Sess., 
67th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 71, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/38(A) (1998), 2056 U.N.T.S. 211 
(entered into force 1 Mar. 1999); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, adopted 25 May 2000, 
G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 97th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 116(a), U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/54/263 (2001), 2173 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force 12 Feb. 2002).
117. Hans-Peter Gasser, Humanitarian Law, in enCyClopedia of huMan righTS, supra note 26, 
at 462, 469.
118. U.N. Charter art. 39, signed 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153 
(entered into force 24 Oct. 1945).
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cation of threats to individuals that are already adequately covered by the 
international law, norms, and practices of human rights. Ramesh Thakur, for 
example, argues that in the human security perspective “the state is but a 
collective instrument to protect human life and enhance human welfare.”119 
This is precisely what the human rights perspective has been since 1948. 
VII. coNcLUSIoN: coMpLEMENTARY oR coMpETING?
This article cautions against assuming that the discourse of human security 
complements, rather than competes with, the international law of human 
rights. International human rights are based on individuals’ capacities to claim 
their human rights from the state; states are obliged to respect, protect and 
fulfill individuals’ human rights. By contrast, the human security discourse 
allows states to convert human rights obligations into “policy talk,” making 
policy choices as to which aspect of human security they might focus on.120
The individual has much stronger standing in international human rights 
law than she has in the human security discourse. The discussion of human 
security de-politicizes “standard threats” to human well-being, while the in-
ternational law of human rights recognizes that threats to human well-being 
are inherently political. Moreover, the suggestion in the human security dis-
course that some human rights should have priority over others undermines 
the principle of indivisibility so crucial to the human rights regime.
More important and disconcerting, much of the academic writing on 
human security bypasses, misinterprets, or ignores international human rights 
law. The broader view of human security often refers to threats already cov-
ered by criminal and human rights law, rather than identifying new threats, 
victims, state duties, or inter-state mechanisms to remedy human insecurity. 
Occasionally, however, the broader view, as proposed by some academics, 
does suggest new types of human insecurity, such as psychological insecu-
rity, not already covered by human rights. Such insecurities, however, are 
not remediable either by states or the international system. Neither law nor 
public policy can remedy all the problems that human beings face.
The narrower view of human security, by contrast, does identify some 
new or more severe threats, sometimes including new potential victims. It 
also focuses on everyone in the world, implying that states should take on 
new responsibilities to non-citizens facing these threats. New state duties and 
new international mechanisms are required to remedy these threats. Thus, 
119. Ramesh Thakur, A Political Worldview, 35 SeCuriTy dialogue 347 (2004).
120. Oberleitner, Porcupines in Love, supra note 40, at 596.
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the narrower view of human security does more than complement human 
rights: it adds to human rights law and provides a framework of analysis 
that should help states and international organizations to take new actions 
in the face of new threats.
